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Abstract
The term Responsible Research and Innovation has recently gained currency, as it has
been designated to be a key-term in the European research framework Horizon 2020.
At the level of European research policy, Responsible Research and Innovation can be
viewed as an attempt to reach a broader vision of research and innovation as a public
good. The current academic debate may be fairly enriched by considering the role that
phronesis may have for RRI. Specifically, in this paper we argue that the current debate
might be fruitfully enriched by making a categorial shift. Such a categorial shift involves
moving away from the temptation to interpret responsible research and innovation in
a technocratic way towards a more pluralistic vision that is rooted in the idea of
phronesis. In the present context phronesis points the attention to the cultivation and
nurturement of the researcher’s formation as a type of engagement with the actual
practice of researching, a practice in which researchers (and other parties concerned)
are called to apply judgment and exercise discretion in specific and often unique
situations without the re-assuring viewpoint of the technician.
Keywords: Phronesis, Responsible research and innovation, Technocratism, Science
governance, Responsibility, Care, Inner goods, Tinkering
In recent years the term Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has gained a con-
siderable amount of attention in Europe. Responsible Research and Innovation can be
considered as an attempt to re-think research and science as a public good (Felt 2014).
We may identify four main elements or pillars that can help us appreciate the kind of
conceptual effort that has been carried out in relation to this.
The first pillar is that research is a resource for society. The traditional view is that
research and innovation pursue their own paths and in doing so society has inevitably to
catch up with them trying to deal with problems that new innovations have contributed to
creating (Marshall 1999; Ogburn 1966). Conversely, Responsible Research and Innovation
posits that research can in fact become a major contributor in addressing the so-called
“grand challenges” of our time (Gardner and Williams 2015; Schomberg 2013; Sutcliffe
2010). The term “grand challenges” – often used in EU documents – refers to the idea
that research can indeed play a key role in tackling existing problems (some of which are
created by the products of research and innovation themselves), as a source of insights
and solutions as to what would be beneficial for society.
The second pillar is participation. RRI posits the importance of engaging citizenry and
all other parties concerned – the so-called stakeholders. That is, addressing the grand
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challenges of our time cannot be done without the involvement and participation of
society in all its variegated expressions and components (Sykes and Macnaghten 2013).
In a way this might be interpreted as a call inviting researchers to broaden their views
concerning the wider social and cultural context in which their work is actually situated.
The third pillar is constituted by a shift from outcomes to processes (Oftedal 2014). RRI
takes seriously the fact that research and innovation are inherently open-ended types of
pursuit. That implies that it is virtually impossible to predict the type of trajectory that
research and innovation will take beforehand, that is,whenwe set off on our journey. It fol-
lows that it is not possible to think of the desired impacts in terms of final outcomes. That
is the reason why RRI focuses more on the way in which we can realistically respond to
situations and opportunities as they arise in the process. Consequently, RRI places increas-
ingly more and more attention upon dispositions that help us work with contingency
like, for instance, being vigilant and prepared to re-orient and even change the course
of our action in due course, when and if the circumstances require so (Schomberg 2013;
Sutcliffe 2010). In some cases, this may mean integrating ethical considerations already
in the design of technologies and direction the attention to the so-called “early impacts”
(Hoven 2013).
The fourth and last pillar is reflexivity. In trying to go beyond an idea of science gov-
ernance that does not solely focus on risks and their (alleged) predictability, reflexivity
brings into the debate the idea that in order to be responsible it is of fundamental impor-
tance to reflect publicly and inclusively on a large plethora of elements such as underlying
purposes, motivations, potential impacts, and assumptions, but also the irreducible fact
of our ignorance and finitude that inevitably characterizes individuals and institutions
(Flipse et al. 2013; Owen et al. 2012; Stilgoe et al. 2013).
So, in a way, Responsible Research and Innovation is apparently a departure from pre-
existing models of research governance (Burget et al. 2016; Landeweerd et al. 2015), as
it places more emphasis on a) the public value and meaning research and innovation
can have, b) awareness of the broader context of research together with the plurality of
positions and interests in the public sphere, c) the importance of being responsive to prob-
lems but also opportunities as they arise, instead of focusing on outcomes, d) a reflexive
stance that would address broader issues concerning underlying elements including our
ignorance and finitude.
Responsible Research and Innovation has gained importance in the European public
arena and a number of contributions have appeared in order to shape what at first appears
to be a broad framework for research policy in Europe. Such contributions have tried
to clarify and develop some of the key elements of the early conceptualisations as they
were formulated in the documents issued by the European Commission. A more precise
vocabulary containing key terms has been provided in order to make RRI a more concrete
object. Such vocabulary has come to include notions like meta-responsibility (Stahl 2013),
inclusive deliberation, anticipatory governance, responsiveness, early assessment of risks
and impacts, reflexivity (Owen et al. 2012).
Overall, RRI constitutes an attempt to present a vision on responsible research and
innovation that is not merely “precautionary” (Grinbaum and Groves 2013), but that is
able to identify and articulate a proposal that takes seriously the collective and political
dimension that cannot be reduced to some form of technocratism according to which the
governance of science is essentially a set of techniques that can be used in order to go
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about a certain problematic situation generated by technology and fix it the way we would
fix a washing machine or a car.
As far as we are concerned in this paper, ourmain aim is to provide a conceptual analysis
that would help us see responsible research (and innovation) in the light of the Aris-
totelian concept of phronesis. This means, as we will try to show in the paper, to take issue
with the main assumptions laying behind technocratism. That is, our conceptual analysis
will contribute to introducing by comparison an alternative way of looking at responsible
research based on the notion ofphronesis, which – we posit – will help to broaden our
horizon concerning how to enrich the meaning that a notion like RRI can have.
What is phronesis? Phronesis is the term introduced by Aristotle in The Nichomachean
Ethics to refer to “a state of capacity” (or faculty) that assists human beings in dealing
with practical affairs (Jullien 2004). Often translated as practical wisdom, phronesis refers
essentially to those situations in which we are called to deliberate and take action. Epis-
temologically speaking, phronesis is an attempt to capture the type of “knowledge” that
can be deployed in practical situations and, as such, it addresses the relationship between
theory and practice (Dunne 1993; Gadamer 2004).
In the last decade or so, phronesis has gained currency in the social sciences and educa-
tion (Flyvbjerg 2001; Flyvbjerg et al. 2012; Carr 2004; Gibbs et al. 2007) as a more rounded
approach to social and human affairs. In particular, phronesis has been called for in order
to develop an approach to human intervention that takes the complexity of social and
human affairs seriously (Tsang 2008). As mentioned above, in this paper the notion of
phronesis will help us find an alternative to a way of thinking that seems to be dominant.
As we will try to show in this article, the main difference between the technocratic
approach and the phronesis-based approach lies in the way in which responsible research
can be conceived. In the former approach, we claim that responsible research is thought
of as a concrete objective that can be brought into existence by the development of
some kind of “toolbox” for managing and assessing risks while implementing the right
impacts – what is considered socially desirable. In the latter one, we posit that responsible
research points to the cultivation and nurturement of a type of engagement with the actual
practice of researching, a practice in which researchers (and other parties concerned) are
called to apply judgment and exercise discretion in specific and often unique situations
without the re-assuring viewpoint of the technician.
In this sense, what we will claim is that the main vocation of Responsible Research
and Innovation may essentially be viewed as educational in the sense that it identifies a
task pertaining to the development of the researcher’s phronesis throughout one’s career,
rather than the mere compliance with rules and the application of a set of techniques
allegedly leading to the right impacts. In this sense, we endorse the view presented by
Landeweerd and colleagues according to which the governance of science can be fruitfully
interpreted as an open-ended learning process (Landeweerd et al. 2015).
The main task that we set for ourselves in this article is to describe the tenets of
the phronesis-based approach by comparison. That is, we will describe this alternative
approach by pointing out the main differences with the technocratic approach. Specifi-
cally, we will compare the two approaches in relation to three main elements that we find
useful heuristically: the conception of intervention and the consequent model of delibera-
tion that is assumed; the source of normative commitment; and the specific interpretation
given to the term “responsibility”.
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It is worth noting that what we aim for is not a description of an approach as it is actually
in use. As we have already noted above, what we are chiefly interested in is to show how
the development of an alternative approach to responsible research based on the notion
of phronesis may provide useful insights about how to broaden the discussion related to
Responsible Research and Innovation, which we seem to be very much in need of (Felt
2014; Forsberg 2015; Landeweerd et al. 2015; Levidow and Neubauer 2014).
Before we proceed, a linguistic specification is in place. Already in the present section,
we have used different terms like Responsible Research and Innovation, responsible
research, science.We now specify what we mean by all these terms. First of all, we will use
the term “Responsible Research and Innovation” in capital letters (or its acronym RRI) to
specifically refer to the various ideas concerning an alternative model of science gover-
nance, which originated from European Union research policy documents. We will use
the term “responsible research” in small letters to refer to the broader issue concerning
responsible research that indeed pre-exists the debate around Responsible Research and
Innovation – capital letters (Solomon 2012).
Conceptions of intervention andmodels of deliberation
The first element that we are going to treat comparatively is intervention. Responsible
Research and Innovation as a proposal concerning science governance is indeed a form
of intervention. That is, RRI is not merely describing a state of affairs. Conversely, it is
supposed to inform the way in which we, as a society, can realistically intervene so as
to steer research and innovation towards our desiderata avoiding at the same time the
negative consequences. In von Schomberg’s words, Responsible Research and Innovation
is “a [a]design strategy which drives innovation and gives some ’steer’ towards achieving
societal desirable goals” (Schomberg 2013, p. 48).
Specifically, the main aim of this first section is to show that our interpretations of what
intervention is may vary significantly depending on the specific approach we take. In the
second part of the section we will also show how we may derive a particular conception
of deliberation in relation to the way in which intervention is interpreted. We will start
from the technocratic approach.
The technocratic approach: intervention as fabrication
The main element characterising the technocratic approach is fairly well summarised by
Jullien. In the technocratic approach:
we set up an ideal form (eidos), which we take to be a goal (telos), and we then act in
such a way as to make it become fact. (Jullien 2004, p. 3)
In this context intervening means bringing about directly and purposefully a specific
outcome that is desired and/or expected. In this sense, intervention can be interpreted as
a way of making or a form of fabrication, as it aims to produce something specific in the
world. Intervention has some fundamental similarities with, for instance, building a bike
frame, a house, a bridge, etc. When we make or build something we usually start off from
an ideal form. That is, something that is essentially a model, a representation of that which
we want to realise. We then subsequently act so as to make it real the same way as we
build a house or a bridge by following a plan or a model, which directly and purposefully
gives shapes to the way in which we should proceed.
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It follows that the idea of deliberation that is more or less tacitly assumed is the one
in which we start off from the goal (or end) that we want to achieve and we subse-
quently walk backwards to identify the most effective means, that is, the steps that
we need to take in order to bring about the desired goal. This implies that deliber-
ation can be turned into an object of objective analysis. That is meant to generate
predictive knowledge, that is, knowledge that serves the purpose of predicting the causal
factors at play in the means-end chain and thus bringing them under our control
(Dunne 1993). The predictive knowledge can be codified in a technique (or a set of
techniques) informing how to intervene. Such a technique can then be used and re-
used effectively like a kind of recipe bringing us step by step closer to the desired
outcome.
Interestingly, this type of knowledge is practical in the sense that it concerns the produc-
tion of “outcomes”. Yet it is fundamentally theoretical in the sense that it is derived from
a model or a plan, that is, an idea. It follows that the limits and the potential drawbacks
we may suffer from derive from the limits of our technique, which ultimately concerns
the identification of the causal factors at play in a given domain. The scientific enterprise
has therefore the role of trying to catch up with our ignorance about those causal factors.
In the technocratic approach, those who possess the knowledge to make something are
then identified as experts. The experts are those who have the kind of knowledge about
the cause-effect relationships guiding one’s own actions and strategies.
Overall, the technocratic model of deliberation is characterised by what is usually called
in cognitive psychology “tunnel vision” (Williams 1988). That is, a very strict criterion
of relevance in choosing between different options of action is adopted, which is always
established beforehand. In doing so, any occurrences or happenings falling outside the
predetermined path are inevitably filtered out. In this sense nothing can be left to chance,
as chance is essentially viewed as a potential obstacle to the achievement of the goal. Or, in
case something is accomplished by chance, that is, serendipitously, this would cast some
doubts on the way in which things were originally pursued (Dunne 1993). That is, the
reliability of the technique used.
As Landeweerd and colleagues (Landeweerd et al. 2015) observed, RRI is a departure
from the idea that the governance of science can only be accomplished by experts, and
so reducing deliberation to some form of evidence-based problem-solving (Biesta 2012).
As we noted above, RRI opens up to a multitude of subjects, named “stakeholders”, that
can actually contribute to the identification of the so-called grand challenges. Spruit and
colleagues, for instance, posit that RRI is characterized by a shift from “assessing the
desirability of the outcome of innovation processes”, often focusing on harmful prod-
uct outcomes, to “assessing the qualities of the innovation process” (Spruit et al. 2015).
Wilford takes a step forward in claiming that RRI creates a step-change in the way that
those who are engaged in research and innovation should consider the impact of what
they do (Wilford 2015, p. 348). This potentially introduces an important element that is
intimately related to the phronesis based approach we are going to discuss. That is, the
focus on the rough grounds of research and researchers’ lived experiences (Manen 1990).
More specifically, the phronesis based approach precisely acknowledges the importance
of addressing research as it is actually lived and, in doing so, it stresses its unpredictabil-
ity and open-endedness, which is what characterizes virtually all approaches that take
complexity seriously (Carr and Hartnett 1996; Coles 2006; Reed 1996).
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As just noted, in the technocratic approach to deliberation the means to achieve a goal
are worked backwards directly from the goal itself. That is where objective analysis comes
into play. A rigorous objective analysis aiming at demonstration allows us to single out
the relevant cause-effect relationships concerning the means so as to better guide our
actions. It is worth noting, though, that the efficacy and effectiveness of means can only be
fully recognised retrospectively. That is, after a course of action has come to an end. Con-
versely, by taking complexity seriously the phronesis-based approach posits that human
intervention takes place in irreversible time (Snowden and Boone 2007). That is to say, we
cannot travel back in time and correct our mistakes. So, unless we are dealing with situa-
tions that repeat identically over a period of time, we cannot realistically rely on the type
of predictive knowledge built on generalisations from previous cases. Thus, predictive
knowledge fundamentally lacks the capacity to guide the course of events as they unfold,
as it is built on retrospective generalisations. These are generalisations formulated on the
basis of the analysis of cases that have already come to an end (see (Taleb 2010) on the so
called “Narrative fallacy”). Consequently, the instrumentality of means remains opaque
and fundamentally hypothetical (Jullien 2004). Generalisations may have a heuristic func-
tion. Indeed, they may suggest a possible course of action. However, their validity remains
tentative and similar to guesswork.
The phronesis-based approach: intervention as full engagement in deliberation
In the phronesis based approach to deliberation the opacity of the means-end chain is
fundamental, as it allows us to take the complexity of human intervention seriously. In
the technocratic approach the relationship means-end is viewed as transparent so that
goals can be achieved directly. The word “directly”, as Kay observed (Kay 2011) , means
that given a goal or an end, we can derive a technique or a procedure that allows us to
achieve the goal without roundabout means. Conversely, in the phronesis based approach
deliberation is intrinsically oblique, to use Kay’s terminology.Whichmeans, first and fore-
most, that there is always a gap between what we may hope for, our high-level objectives,
and the actual translations of those into the real world (Kay 2011). Means have their own
autonomy and they cannot be derived so easily from an idea. Their adaptation is, in other
words, always problematic (Jullien 2004, pp. 35–36).
So, in this sense, we may think that the main goals for RRI (i.e. facing the grand
challenges of our time, the engagement of an informed public in identifying the soci-
etal priorities, etc.) are more like high-level objectives, ideals, rather than mere goals to
accomplish like, for instance, arriving at the office on time, delivering a good presentation
at a conference, or finding a time slot for a faculty board meeting. We may say that they
are a direct expression of what Rawls called “the ideal theory”, which specifies the best
that we can hope for (Rawls 1971).
The fact that the phronesis-based approach takes seriously the gap between high-level
objectives andmore intermediate goals means that deliberation focuses on what Chia and
Holt termed indirect ways in assonance to Kay’s obliquity (Chia and Holt 2009) . That is,
instead of trying to find a bird’s eye view approach to take full control of otherwise open-
ended processes, indirect ways make use of strategies as they emerge in due course in
an extensive effort tomuddle through (Mintzberg et al. 1976). That forbids naive reliance
upon predictive knowledge, while it turns the attention to immediate concerns and corre-
sponding activities of practical coping (Chia and R. and Holt 2006), which ultimately rely
Bardone and Lind Life Sciences, Society and Policy  (2016) 12:5 Page 7 of 18
on the ability to tinker with chance events (Bardone 2016) and to work and create with
contingency (cf. (Hyde 1998)).
Obliquity, indirect ways, tinkering with contingency, all point to an approach to delib-
eration characterised by the absence of a reliable technique to figure out how to proceed.
Conversely, it points to the exercise of discretion and the application of judgment as an
alienable attribute of the human agent, which forces us to stand “in the openness” (Hansen
and Amundson 2009).
Interestingly, since deliberation resorts to discretion, the criterion of correctness of
deliberation cannot be directly inferred from predictive knowledge. Correctness can in
fact only be assessed afterwards. Therefore, it can never be the guiding principle for apply-
ing judgment and exercising discretion in situations as they unfold, as we have already
noted above.
This has an important consequence concerning the relationship between knowledge,
on the one hand, and judgment and choice, on the other.What acquires importance in the
context of making a decision in the phronesis-based approach is not so much the tradi-
tional notion of expertise as themore elusive notion of sagacity (Merton and Barber 2006).
As far as we are concerned here, sagacity is not to be intended as a specific type of knowl-
edge enabling a person to gain control over a specific practical domain. Conversely, it
points to the generally unassorted amalgam of skills, competences, knowledge – acquired
in different times and situations – which, nonetheless, may come in handy, when and if
circumstances allow. We claim that this amalgam of skills, competence, types of knowl-
edge, etc., cannot really be identified or described in its totality. Nor can it be consciously
developed independently from the actual and concrete situations one happens to face in
one’s own profession, of which they are a direct manifestation. This means that there is
nothing like a body of expertise that can be clearly pinned down beforehand, as the type
of knowledge required becomes clear only in due course, that is, only as a result of being
fully engaged with the particular situation at hand.
The phronetic conception of deliberation that we have briefly sketched out bears
important connection with reflexivity, which we have mentioned in the introduc-
tory section as one of the RRI pillars. What has been argued by several authors
(Forsberg 2015; Stilgoe et al. 2013) is that the role of reflexivity would be that of holding “a
mirror up to one’s activities commitments and assumptions, being aware of the limits of
knowledge and being mindful that a particular framing of an issue may not be universally
held” (Stilgoe et al. 2013). This conception fairly matches with the interpretation of the
term that Sandywell 1996 contributed to develop, according to which reflexivity is a fun-
damental component of what we may call “public rationality”, as it fosters – among others
– critical interrogation of the social conditions, dialogue, historicity, socially negotiated
meaning, and socially informed, critical and thoughtful action (cf. (Kinsella 2012)). In the
particular context of RRI, reflexivity clearly helps bring to the fore questions related to
values and beliefs, which inevitably emerge in research-related processes along with our
ignorance and finitude as ontological dimensions (Groves 2009). In this sense, reflexivity
goes beyond reflection, as it does not solely regard reflecting on the so-called first-oder
realities. Reflexivity is in this sense what Arendt (1977) has identified with the most
important aspect of being human, namely, thinking as a public good.
The phronesis-based approach is very much in line with this point of view. However it
adds an important element (cf. (Hostetler 2016; Kinsella 2012)). In the light of phronesis
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we may argue that reflexivity is already embedded in the exercise and application of
judgment (Birmingham 2004), which, in turn, is rooted in the researcher’s formation
(Building) (Green 2011). In a way, we may argue that phronesis allows us to see forma-
tion as a key element enabling responsibility to emerge within the researcher, because it is
formation, rather than reflexivity, that prepares researchers to apply judgment what con-
cerns the role that their own work may have within the larger spectrum of social concerns
and public hopes. In other words, it is the researcher’s formation allowing him or her to
remain attentive to the context and to adopt a more anticipatory and responsive stance,
which is central to RRI (Stilgoe et al. 2013).
Focusing on formation also rehabilitates a family of apparently pre-reflective cognitive
“faculties” – often undermined because of their inevitable ambiguity and vagueness, in
which a summary appraisal of a situation is alreadymade without indulging in any process
of further reflection. We are talking about abilities such as intuition, perception, acuity of
vision, and ability to read the situation (Hostetler 2016; Kinsella 2012).
This last consideration leads us to pointing out that in the phronesis-based approach
the interpretation that is given to intervention is not that of making or producing a certain
state of affairs, but that of active or full engagement as a result of the cultivation and
nurturement of the researcher’s formation. This is an important point, because it allows
us to broaden up the discussion concerning what we may call “RRI-related” issues. We
may then argue that doing RRI can be viewed as essentially rooted in the way in which
researchers (and other parties concerned) practice, interpret their own work and make
sense of it for themselves.
In the light of what we have argued, RRI may well concern and refer to research from
the researcher’s point of view, that is, the point of view of responsible professionals (cf.
(Grinbaum and Groves 2013)). There are, in fact, a number of issues and predicaments
that have a larger impact on research (and innovation) than we may think. For instance,
developmental issues like the formation of one’s worldview and intellectual conscience
concerning science and research (Nixon 2004), emotions in the academia (Bloch 2012),
competitive identities (Elizabeth and Grant 2013; Malcolm and Zukas 2009), all issues
that are often neglected.
In this sense, what is central to this interpretation is the notion of human agency that
casts the attention on “purposive acts of knowledgeable agents that intervene in the
relevant process and that, at any point in time, could have acted otherwise” (Giddens
1979; Pandza and Ellwood 2013). The centrality of human agency implies reconsidering
what responsible research may stand for, as it may refer to a variety of issues, which are
rooted, and therefore inseparable from the way in which researchers and other parties
concerned go about their own day-to-day activities (Gjefsen and Fisher 2014). In the tech-
nocratic approach, as we noted above, the emphasis is placed upon techniques like for
instance those related tomanaging and assessing risks. Conversely, in the phronesis-based
approach such techniques may indeed still play an important role. However, it is only the
exercise of discretion and the application of human judgment in specific situations as they
arise using one’s own sagacity that allows researchers along with other parties involved to
take the responsibility for what they are doing.
In a way we may argue that, if we re-locate responsibility in the exercise of discretion
and the application of judgment, which in turn is rooted in one’s own engagement with
research and his/her character, we may broaden the spectrum of, say, RRI sensitive issues
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so as to involve all forms of science and types of research. That is, we do not exclusively
identify RRI issues in the so-called ethically sensitive areas. But in the phronetic space,
which is precisely the one in which researchers and other concerned parties inevitably
have to tinker, apply judgment, exercise discretion, etc. Before we will come directly to
discussing the meaning and interpretation given to responsibility, which we have just
mentioned, we will address a preliminary question that deals with normative commitment.
Normative commitment and the role of ethics
By “normative commitment” we essentially refer to the constellation of values, principles,
dispositions, and strategies that come to inform and guide one’s behaviour either tacitly
or explicitly. In other words, as far as we are concerned here, the term “normative com-
mitment” regards the way in which human agents – researchers, in our case – engage
with values, principles, etc. (Dreier 2002).
The technocratic approach: applied ethics as a reflexive add-on
As we have observed above, the technocratic approach posits that the pursuit of a goal is
inherently an objective, technical matter. That is, it is about bringing the relevant causal
factors under one’s rational direction so as to achieve the desired outcome. What logi-
cally follows is an unbridgeable separation between what should be done in the technical
sense and what should be done in the ethical sense. The former is informed by predictive
knowledge, whereas the latter by ethical principles. Virtually, there are no ways in which
the two camps may come to overlap.
Because of this rigid split between what is technical and what is ethical, normative com-
mitment is essentially a source of constraints to a process that relies on strategies which
are fundamentally alien to the ethical discourse. Nozick termed this way of looking at
normative commitment (and ethics) “the-side-constraint” view (Nozick 1974). Grinbaum
and Groves posit that according to this view ethics is essentially a source of immutable
decrees, which establish what is wrong and what it right (Grinbaum and Groves 2013).
This view is deontological in essence, and consequently the resulting conception of
responsibility is related to compliance with pre-existing rules.
For example, in doing research we may say that there are technical rules pertaining to
the way in which research should be conducted to achieve good results. Ethical rules are
not of the same kind, as they constrain behaviour so long as ethical principles are con-
cerned. That is, ethics comes into play, when a piece of research touches upon an ethically
sensitive area. So, in conducting a research involving personal data, the researcher should
comply with rules enforcing the protection of privacy. In this sense research and ethics
meet incidentally. This way of thinking has been widely adopted in the various applied
ethics approaches, which have flourished in the last decade or so in order to make the
governance of science more ethically friendly, so to say (Landeweerd et al. 2015).
The split we have just mentioned has several conceptual consequences worth mention-
ing here. The first is that a class of people, namely, ethicists, is then designated as experts.
Their main function is to inform researchers about the ethical constraints. Secondly,
ethics is fundamentally an add-on (Felt 2014). That is, something externally added to the
pre-existing pursuit. Which implies that there is no way to steer or influence the pursuit
internally, because that would mean to interfere with the accomplishment of goals, which
is inherently a technical issue, as we noted above. Thirdly, since constraints are often set
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on undesired impacts, the resulting ethical discourse is inevitably biased towards a vocab-
ulary in which risk and safety are predominant, if not hegemonic, in spelling out issues
and priorities – what we want. Fourthly, it follows that the areas of major concern are con-
sequently identified among those disciplines, which fit in with the “risk discourse” (Zinn
2010). So, for example, disciplines like nanomedicine are considered more sensitive than,
say, ethnology or sociology, because it is in a way easier to frame their applied outcomes
in terms of the oppositional pair “undesired/desired outcomes”. That is why, we posit,
the social sciences and humanities are so often viewed as playing a mere ancillary role
(Felt 2014).
The phronesis-based approach: the centrality of inner goods
The phronesis-based approach takes a different route. As we argued above, what is cen-
tral to the phronesis-based approach is the idea that the researcher’s agency takes central
stage. That is, it does not contemplate a rigid split between means and goals. Conse-
quently it attributes a fundamental role to one’s ability to apply judgment and exercise
discretion in concrete and specific situations that defy the rigid application of a certain
technique (or a set of techniques). That implies that it is harder to draw a sharp line
between ethical rules and principles, on the one hand, and mere technical rules, on the
other, as they inevitably come together in the person who acts. In the phronesis-based
approach, we posit, one’s normative commitment cannot be separated from one’s active
and full engagement with the practice itself.
In this respect, RRI seems to represent a major step forward in comparison with other
applied ethics approaches, because it places more emphasis on the process of research
and innovation (Gjefsen and Fisher 2014; Oftedal 2014).Wemay call this “embeddedness”.
Which means that to be engaged in RRI-related activities would imply to be fully part of
the very process one studies. In other words, it is a call for the identification of issues as
part of one’s sense-making process. And this can be done regardless of one’s disciplinary
background and the outcomes that a particular discipline can have.
We may take a step further arguing that responsible research may not be viewed as
exclusively pertaining to the so-called ethically sensitive areas in medicine and engineer-
ing with the social sciences and humanities acting like reflective add-ons (Felt 2014).
Conversely, it may potentially identify a cluster of issues, situations, and questions – all
chiefly concerning research as it is lived. In this sense one’s normative commitment can-
not be reduced to, or exhausted by, the mere compliance with a set of rules or principles
externally appended – what we may call the checkmark ethics. Therefore, one’s normative
commitment can be profitably identified in the midst of research as a lived practice. As
such, we claim, it deals with the embodiment of the so-called “internal goods” of research.
The notion of internal goods was introduced by Macintyre to go beyond a reductionist
interpretation of morality centered on rules, rights and duties (MacIntyre 1984). To illus-
trate his point Macintyre makes the following case. Suppose that we would like to teach a
child how to play chess. In order to do that, we may trick him into playing by giving him,
for example, some candies every time he plays. Alternatively, we may try to engage the
child by inviting him to play chess hoping that sooner or later he will find some interest in
it for what it is.
According to Macintyre, the main difference between these two approaches is that in
the first case we would rely on external goods – the candies, whereas in the second case
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we would try to engage the child on the basis of what he termed internal goods. A candy
is an external good, because it can be pursued as a good (something to desire or worth
pursuing) independently from what one is actually doing – whether he is playing chess or
any other game. The same goes for power, prestige, money or fame, for instance, which,
indeed, can become objects to pursue regardless of the particular practice one is engaged
with. We can invariably pursue power or fame as academics, politicians, entrepreneurs,
etc.
Conversely, an internal good is always specific to the practice we are involved in and it
requires the person’s active and full engagement. As such, we can identify and recognise
them if we have gained relevant experience and familiarity with the practice (MacIntyre
1984, p. 220). In other words, it implies to take the point of view of those who are working
from within the practice. For an internal good is fundamentally pursued for its own sake.
It is worth noting that the inner goods of a practice are not inherently ethical. They
cannot be mistaken for some kind of “checkmarks” to have. Nor do they refer to abstract
ethical rules or principles that are somehow appended from the outside like in the-side-
constraint view. Conversely, as we have just noted, they address questions related to the
ends of the practice and as such they identify what is good within the practice itself,
where the word “good” may refer to something that is ideally well crafted, done with care
and desirable. In this sense the ethical dimension is already operating even within those
aspects of the practice that may appear merely technical. Internal goods are therefore
embodied rather then applied. More specifically, internal goods are embodied in those
virtues enabling us to actively and profitably take part in research. Among those virtues
we may find, for instance, humility and scepticism (Merton 1973), criticism (Popper
1970), flexibility and open-endedness (Kuhn 1970).
We claim that reflexivity, which we have mentioned above as one of the RRI pillars,
bears an important relation with the notion of inner goods. Consider the following case.
In a study published in 2005 Gabehart showed that about 30 % of the citations 211
retracted articles obtained were after retraction (Gabehart 2005). Surprisingly, only 3 %
of those citations were actually negative. This is indeed surprising, because we would
expect, at least, the number of negative citations to be higher after retraction. Conversely,
the fact it only occurred in a very small fraction of papers seems to suggest that post-
retraction citations occurred indiscriminately well beyond the function of the so-called
“ceremonial citations” (Via and Schmidle 2007). As Smith argued in commenting this very
case, considerations related to impact factor may have encouraged researchers to do so
(Smith 2006).
Smith adds to the list other surprising facts related to the so-called “citation behaviour”.
That is, it is not surprising to see researchers erect “citation cartels” with the specific aim
to artificially increase their impact factor. So, for example, the editor of a journal may
ask authors to cite articles published in the same journal in order to get published. In
the same vain, Matías-Guiu and García-Ramos reported about the practice of “chopping”
one single research into small chunks with the very same intent to artificially increase the
number of publications and therefore potential citations. It is difficult to see that more
articles may lead to more citations.
As far as we are concerned here, we would not see these as examples of ethical miscon-
duct. Unless it is clear that a researcher was actually forced to cite papers published in a
certain journal, we would not see any clear misconduct. Merton reported in the past on
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all those biases that researchers often fall victim of (Merton 1968). That is the case, for
instance, of the so-calledMatthew effect, which states that it is more likely that often cited
papers get more citations according to the very same principle as “the rich gets richer”.
We would regard them as examples of lack of reflexivity. That is, reflexivity would call
into doubt the explicit pursuit of a good external to research. Such pursuit would in fact
create friction with the internal goods of research itself and casts doubts in the public eye
on the trustworthiness of research itself and its value as a social practice.
As a consequence of this lack of reflexivity, one’s engagement with research is inevitably
impoverished. Whether or not the impact factor actually measures scholarity, its direct
and instrumental pursuit has nothing to do, for instance, with improving the reliability
of the study or the originality of one’s ideas, which can be seen as inner goods. Quite
the contrary, targeting the impact factor interferes, for instance, with the actual pursuit
of inner goods, as it strays from the kind of commitment to knowledge researchers are
supposed to embody as men and women of science.
In general, the reference to inner goods potentially opens up to an interpretation of
responsibility that is a non outcome-based conception of responsibility, namely, respon-
sibility as care, which has been put forward by several authors in the debate around RRI
(Grinbaum and Groves 2013; Stilgoe et al. 2013). More specifically, we claim that, while it
is not possible to directly identify the potential pitfalls of research and innovation (see the
first section of this article), a normative commitment based on the embodiment of and
care for the internal goods of research, may have significance results, even when it does
not directly address questions related to risk or safety.
Responsibility
The technocratic approach: responsibility as outcome-based
As we have argued in the first section, the technocratic approach posits that interven-
tion is fundamentally a form of production. We intervene in the world in order to bring
into existence an ideal or a model, which, therefore, precedes our engagements with the
world. That is, it comes before we act in it and it therefore gives our activities meaning
and significance. What logically follows is a conception of responsibility that is essentially
outcome-based. That is, it is based on the achievement of a certain outcome.
If we act with the specific intent to bring about a certain state of affairs, then what turns
out to be central is knowledge of causality, as Adam and Grooves pointed out (Adam and
Groves 2011). When we say, for instance, that somebody is responsible for something,
we tacitly assume that there is a specific causal relationship linking what a person does
and the world. When this causal relationship is looked for in the past, then we speak of
responsibility as liability. For example, if we say that Jane is responsible for the accident
that has recently occurred in my block, then what we mean is we are in the position to
identify the sequence of events showing Jane’s decisive role in causing the accident (Adam
and Groves 2011). This conception of responsibility is used in court. As far as the tech-
nocratic approach is concerned, there is another form of outcome-based responsibility
that is worth discussing. That is, the one ascribing responsibility to an individual (or a
group of individuals) for a future event. In this case the causal relationship between what
we do and the world is actually located in the future in terms of what we would like to
achieve. That is, a causal relationship exists, not for a past event like in the case of liabil-
ity, but it is assumed for a future one. That is in a nutshell the notion of responsibility as
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accountability (Giri 2000), which is very much attached to the deontological approach we
referred to above (Grinbaum and Groves 2013).
Since the technocratic approach assumes that an intervention aims to produce a certain
outcome, then the ascription of responsibility is preordained to taking upon one’s shoul-
der the task to produce (in the sense of bringing into existence) the desired outcome. In
this sense responsible research can be interpreted as the one in which researchers (and
other parties concerned) are held accountable for bringing about what is desired or/and
for avoiding what it is not desired. It is only then that we may say that he/she is actually
responsible.
Worth noting, as responsibility is linked to knowledge of causality, the outcome, which
one should produce and therefore he/she is held accountable for, should be known in
advance.
Grinbaum and Groves rightly pointed out that the whole idea of responsible research
and innovation is characterized by some conceptual and practical difficulties, because
we are essentially dealing with something that is in a fundamental way future-oriented
(Grinbaum and Groves 2013). Both research and innovation are essentially affected by
uncertainty and indeterminacy. As they put it, “being responsible becomes subject to
increasing uncertainty” (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, p. 122). In this sense the notion of
responsibility that we are looking for inevitably has to have a “prospective dimension”
(Owen et al. 2012, p.31). It follows a fundamental disaffection with approaches that focus
on accountability, liability and (causal) evidence (cf. (Stilgoe et al. 2013)), which contribute
to a general re-conceptualization of the term “responsibility” as care, which is the main
topic of the present section.
The phronesis-based approach: responsibility as care
As just noted, the open-ended character of research and innovation makes it virtually
impossible to ascribe responsibility to an unknown event in this specific sense. It reduces
the space of action to the achievement of an outcome that is already known. Whereas,
as Grinbaum and Groves brilliantly pointed out, “creative action and innovation point
forwards, opening up the world the past has created and adding new entities to it that
change the way it works” (p. 124). In doing so a conception of responsibility as account-
ability restricts the way we can actually express our human agency and creativity, which
is central to the approach based on phronesis, as we have noted in the previous section.
Besides, outside of a narrow deontological interpretation of our ethical commitments,
the whole notion of responsibility can be viewed not as something that is imputed to
us (as it is for accountability), but rather as something that we actively take (Adam and
Groves 2011). That is why, if we move away from the technocratic approach, another,
strictly non outcome-based and future-oriented interpretation of responsibility becomes
possible (cf. (Grinbaum and Groves 2013)). And that is the idea of responsibility as
care.
Consider, for example, the case in which a university professor feels responsible for her
PhD students. If by that we mean that she is accountable, then we should specify the
outcome she is actually held responsible for. That is, the one that she has to produce.
This outcome should be indeed known beforehand and it could be, for example, the num-
ber of students successfully defending their PhD in five years. She would be then held
responsible for the PhD student, because she has to hit the numbers.
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However, at least on a mere intuitive level, we feel that there is something more. The
word “responsibility” may refer to the fact that the supervisor in question is responsible
in the sense that she actually cares about her PhD students and is responsive.
Care and responsiveness refer to the fact that responsibility is always related to
“responding to somebody”, to “giving an answer”. But not in the narrow sense of providing
an account of why one has been doing this or that, as Lucas (1993) argued. We are talking
more about a negative form of responsibility, which, according to Lucas, is not pressing
for an account, but pointing to a duty of care, which is the kind of response that we own
“in the here-and-now of praxis”, as he put it (Lucas 1993, p. 53).
More in general, we may argue that care in this case is a type of engagement with
the world (Heidegger 2010), which takes a different perspective than responsibility as
providing an account justifying one’s action (often a posteriori). First of all, care is an
act that is done for its own sake. That is, the supervisor would care about her students
regardless of hitting the numbers. Which means that care, strictly speaking, has no instru-
mental value. That is, it is not imputed in relation to a goal to achieve. Conversely, we
argue that care is rooted in one’s own agency, as it presupposes the type of engagement
in which a person is called to exercising discretion and apply judgment, as we noted
above.
Besides, it also reflects the way a person is as a whole and so comprising her own values,
habits, competences, knowledge, namely, her entire worldview. In this sense care does not,
and cannot refer to a legalistic framework based on the compliance with a set of rules of
conduct. The notion of care reaches beyond, as it appoints the individual with the power
to take initiative and act in the world.
It follows that care is not just a moral disposition exhibited by good-hearted people, as
it holds on to the way in which a person makes sense of her engagements with the world.
To go back to the example, a supervisor cares for her PhD students in a sense that her acts
and deeds – what she does and says – are the fullest expression of her way of going about
her profession, her making sense of it.
There is an additional element that is worth mentioning here. As Gilligan famously
argued, care does not involve a commitment towards the world in the abstract sense of
universal rules of conduct (Gilligan 1982). Conversely, the act of caring is always attuned
to the everyday ongoings, that is, the here-and-nows, which connect us back to exercis-
ing discretion and applying judgment, as there are no techniques or recipes that inform
directly the way we should act.
More generally, care is not limited to the taking care of another human being. It is the
care of one’s own disciplines and the possibility to advance in knowledge. As such, care
is an expression of something coming out of oneself, as just noted. It follows that the
interpretation of responsibility as care depicts the researcher, to use Gadamer’s words,
“directly confronted with what he sees” instead of “standing over against a situation that
he merely observes” (Gadamer 2004, p. 324). This element connects back to the idea of
intervention as engagement we discussed in the first section.
So, we may now argue that responsibility as care refers to a kind of day-by-day type of
intervention related to the praxis (Lucas 1993), which is not exclusively moral, as it gives
up on any deontological commitment to bringing about a certain known state of affairs (as
opposed to responsibility as accountability), while remaining open to what can actually
be achieved in the specific context of one’s action.
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One last consideration. As we have argued before, the phronesis based approach sup-
ports the so-called oblique or indirect ways. That is, when we care, we are engaged in the
world not to fulfil a goal. But we are immediately attuned to, and therefore taking care of
the rough grounds of the practice, the day-to-day activities, while renouncing to address
directly what we may call “the grand challenges”, our high-level objectives. Yet we claim
that taking care may help get closer to the same very high-level objectives but indirectly.
Interestingly, this is well formulated in the British proverb “take care of the pennies, and
the pounds will take care of themselves”. More specifically, we may see care as that which
tries to bridge the gap between our high objectives and the more mundane level of our
day-to-day activities.
Parting thoughts. Towards a phronetic space for responsible research (and
innovation)
What we have tried to sketch in this paper is an approach based on the Aristotelian notion
of phronesis, which may help explore the plurality of issues that may go under the general
label of “responsible research”. In turn, this exercise, which is eminently conceptual, also
aimed to broaden up the current discussion related to Responsible Research and Innova-
tion (RRI), which seems to stagnate around various techniques of risk management and
procedures of public participation.
Specifically, we have tried to argue for the importance of re-locating responsible
research and innovation into a phronetic space. Such phronetic space is not meant to
identify techniques to apply or ethical codes to follow. Conversely, it focuses on the idea
of responsible research as the cultivation and nurturement of the researcher’s formation
as a type of engagement with the actual practice of research for what it is – an open-ended
enterprise. That is to say, an enterprise that is mainly devoted to exploration, inquiry, and
discovery done for its own sake.
As we pointed out, if we acknowledge the fundamental open-endedness of research
as a practice, responsible research cannot be something one is simply imputed. Con-
versely, it is something that is taken and so embodied in the researcher’s agency and
that of other parties participating in the world of research directly or indirectly. Such
agency is exhibited in intervening in relevant processes that, at any point in time, could
be otherwise.
As we have tried to show, this means, more specifically, that intervention, and conse-
quently deliberation concerning how to proceed, cannot be reduced to a technique or
formal procedure informing themaking of something. Conversely, it is essentially rooted
in the researcher’s exercise of discretion and application of judgment, which cannot be
categorised resorting to expert judgment. It is an expression of one’s own active and full
engagement.
The exercise of discretion and judgment along with the development of sagacity is not
arbitrary, a-moral, aprioristic or free from any normative considerations concerning how
one should act. That is because the practice has its own internal goods pointing to what is
desired, done with care and well crafted, which researchers (and other parties concerned)
come into contact with by experiencing and living research for themselves (Reed 1996),
not by rigid compliance with some kind of ethical code. This is a fundamental step to take,
for example, towards seeing the alienation of research from researchers as a major source
of irresponsibility. By that we mean those external interferences diverting researchers
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from full engagement and the embodiment of the internal goods. That includes, indeed,
private interests, but also 1) aggressive policies enforcing accountability favouring con-
servative tactics rather than promoting the pursuit of new directions (Shore and Wright
2015); 2) the discourse around the impacts (Briggle 2014; Watermeyer 2014) and their
effect on academic identities (Watermeyer 2015); 3) the shortsighted views on indicators
of scientific productivity and excellence in academia (Wood 2012) that, once indiscrim-
inately targeted for their own sake, lose their own reliability (Foster et al. 2015) and, at
the same time, contribute to the emergence of epistemic inequality among the different
disciplines and scientific cultures (Lõhkivi et al. 2013).
Re-locating responsibility into the researcher’s phronetic space means that responsible
research is ultimately a form of taking care, which already points to a relational aspect
implicit in one’s work that reaches far beyond the discourse around public participation
and engagement. Here care refers primarily to the way a researcher (and other parties
concerned) relates to people he/she gets in touch with as well as to research as a public
good. The idea of research as public good goes well beyond the instrumental and reduc-
tionist view of research and science, according to which one’s contribution is assessed in
terms of the impacts – real or merely imagined – that it might have on the GDP. Con-
versely, research as public good is related to the idea that research is an expression of
what Karl Jaspers in his The Idea of University (Jaspers 1959) called “man’s fundamental
and primary thirst for knowledge”, which, as such, proceeds, although it is not in con-
trast with, all considerations related to usefulness. Such a thirst for knowledge goes well
beyond simple curiosity, and it can be viewed as an enduring (and sometimes tantalising)
interest that views exploration and inquiry as a way to establish a contact with the world
outside oneself, as Polanyi put it (Polanyi 1964).
It is worth noting that the type of engagement that we have described is not to be taken
as a normative model to force upon researchers and all other parties concerned. Con-
versely, I posit that it should be viewed chiefly as an educational challenge for research
and teaching institutions, single researchers and the society as a whole. By “educational
challenge” I mean that responsible research is essentially a type of engagement to develop
in time rather than an outcome to bring about once and for all. That is, it is located in,
and is not separable from, one’s own way of becoming a part of the “practice” of research
for oneself.
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